Although regional variations within the southern states have been widely recognized, those variations have received little sys tematic attention from political scientists beyond the usual nod to "mountain Republicanism" and, in some cases, the alignment of Democratic party factions along geographical lines.1 Yet, in his analysis of American federalism from the perspective of the states, Elazar argues that many intrastate political conflicts flow from differing subcultural orientations that are typically associated with constrasting settlement patterns of geographic regions within the states.2 Thus, southern states tend to be divided broadly in terms of mountain areas and plantation areas. More recently, major urban areas have emerged with features distinctive from either of these geographically-based regions. At the same time, there is a pecul iarly "Southern" culture associated with an elitist politics fostered 25
factors to be extracted.5 While any criterion for such extraction is arbitrary, the decision to use this widely-recognized statistical test gives greater weight to arguments for the existence of the basic types of variation, particularly if the numbers conform to the predicted values.
Q-factoring of the datasets is mandated as the resultant factors cluster together those counties that have common patterns of varia tion and thus the Q-factors represent operationally-defined "politicocultural areas" within each state. To the extent that a factor is composed of more or less contiguous counties, that factor consti tutes a "region." The factor score matrices present standardized values for each of the attributes across these basic types of politicocultural areas, thus allowing analysis of the distinctive fea tures of each area.
While the larger, unique datasets provide the statistical infor mation for most of the findings reported here, separate Q-factor analyses were also performed for each state using the 61 attributes common to both datasets. 6 These analyses allow correlation of the typal arrays (factor scores) across types of counties for both states, thus permitting a test of the congruency of politicocultural areas between the states. Findings The factor analytic results confirm the existence of three dis tinct politicocultural areas both in Alabama and Arkansas.7 Moreover, for each state, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 , two more or less contiguous regions distinguishing the "plantation" area from the "mountain" area emerged, as did a distinctive Urban County type. Thus, for Alabama, Factor I is the Black Belt Region cluster ing 24 southern counties with its 9 best representatives all from that portion of the state traditonally called "The Black Belt." Factor II is the Urban County with Jefferson County (Birmingham) as a virtu ally pure representative, and Factor III is the Northern-Wiregrass County with its best representatives all from the more mountainous areas of the North. This third factor groups the "Wiregrass" area, a tier of counties bordering the Florida Panhandle with the northern rather than southern counties.
In Arkansas, Factor 1 is the Ozark Region clustering counties largely in the northwestern and more mountainous areas of the 27 state, Factor II is the Delta Region with its best representatives all from the Mississippi Delta area although the type includes most of the southeastern portion of the state, and Factor III is the Urban County. Thus, the basic politicocultural areas within these two southern states do conform to the hypothesized regional and/or settlement patterns that have generally been recognized in the past. Tallapoosa   13  16  27  46  35  49  51  32  50  40  38  48  49  55  50  43  40  36  56  59  34  58  61  54  58  61  61  53  61  56  48  46  62  42  67  60   93  89  84  72  68  66  31  46  31  35  40  31  32  25  37  45  39  34  29  20  53  29  21  36  29  28  30  37  24  37  45  39  32  55  22  38   09  33  35  43  48  51  78  78  78  78  77  77  76  76  76  75  75  74  74  74  74  73  72  72  72  72  71  71  70  70  69  68  68  68  68 In order to determine if these intrastate types conform to Elazar's subcultural variants, however, their attribute arrays must be examined. This is to say that the Alabama Black Belt Region and the Arkansas Delta Region, steeped in the traditions of the Old South, should exhibit the characteristics of the Traditionalistic subculture, the Alabama Northern-Wiregrass counties and the Arkansas Ozark Region should conform more strongly to the Moralistic orientation, and the Urban County of both states should reflect the emergence of an increasingly Individualistic pattern. Still, two caveats should be announced here. First, both states are indeed deeply embedded in the larger southern Traditionalistic political culture so that intrastate variations are largely matters of degree and unlikely to be dramatic. The second warning centers upon the usual complaint of behavioral scientists who must resort to using aggregate date: "we just can't find the purest measures of the relevant indicators."
T a b le
Still, the results exhibited in Tables 3 and 4 tend to support Elazar's contention of basic subcultural variations within the states.8 While the more dramatic differences between regions are largely found in distinctive social and economic traits, there are notable differences in their politics that are not necessarily related to socioeconomic variations.
Profiles of expected variations of the three subcultural types with regard to those traits measured by the available data would be as follows. The Moralistic subculture will stress public education given its emphasis on the citizen's obligation to participate in the political life of the community. This motive should also produce higher rates of participation, particularly in the electoral system. On the other hand, private solutions to social problems are pre ferred to public ones, thus, for example, public debt will be lower. And if public solutions must be resorted to, then those decisions should remain as close to the people as possible, hence, local reve nue sources will be preferred and automony of such local govern ment units as school districts will be stronger. The marketplace orientation of the Individualistic subculture will produce a very different profile. With the active demands of many different groups, public expenditures decisions will be more balanced across program areas. There is not likely to be a strong effort to involve citizens in politics, thus relatively low voter registration but high voter turnout among those who do bother to register. And with government perceived as simply an extension of the economic marketplace, it will seek revenues equally well from any source and will not shy from capital investment even if it means public inde btedness. Finally, efficiency and professionalism are more strongly prized, leading to a greater reliance on hierarchy and administra tive decision making, hence less autonomy for specialized govern ments and fewer elected officials. The Traditionalistic subculture generally will fall between the other two on most measures al though there should be noticeably less popular participation.
The evidence of conformity to these cultural prototypes by the intrastate politicocultural areas is mixed at best. The Moralistic profile fits the Ozark County rather well. There is very high voter registration and, given its generally older population, relatively strong commitment to public education. Moreover, public debt is very low although this no doubt is also a reflection of the extreme poverty found in such a county. And contrary to the model, the Ozark County is strongly dependent upon intergovernmental rev enues, perhaps even more than the lack of economic wealth would suggest. But at the same time there is strong evidence of a desire to keep political power close to the people with the extremely large 31 number of elected local officials and the stronger likelihood of school district tax autonomy. The Northern-Wiregrass County of Alabama does not conform so well.9 Still, there is the apparent tendency to avoid public dept and a strong self-reliance in revenue production. Beyond these traits, in both states these are the areas that reflect the most independence from partisan affiliations in voting. On more idiosyncratic measures note the relative resistance of the Ozark County to adopting federal food programs and the greater participation in litigation on welfare matters and the higher score of the Northern-Wiregrass County on the Index of Union Sentiment. 10 The political attributes of the Urban County of both states tend to be very similar and generally conform to the Individualistic model. Public expenditures do tend to be more balanced across policy areas. Popular participation is low in terms of voter registra tion but in Arkansas (comparable data for Alabama is unavailable) those who register exhibit a strong likelihood of voting and are more partisan. Public indebtedness is high as predicted. However, the Urban County appears to be more self-reliant in obtaining public revenues but then such a county is much wealthier than other types in either state. And in both states there are relatively fewer elected local officials and public school districts have inde pendent taxing power. Still, this suggests at least a greater reliance on hierarchy in government. 67  66  65  63  62   41  25  31  43  40  48  47  32  32  56  49  60  45  52  54  56  58  65  41  48  53  58  60  56  40  62  45  46  51  60  58  55   50  43  54  53  49   86  85  83  83  82  81  80  78  77  75  75  75  71  69  69  69  68  67  67  66  66  66  65  65  65  64  63  63  62  60  59  56   51  54  43  41  58   17  36  37  28  35  26  33  50  46  26  37  19  48  42  40  39  36  23  57  47  46  33  39  38  49  37  56  57  52  40 The Black Belt and Delta types do not appear to be so con gruent in their political attributes as the Urban types but more so than is the case for Northern-Wiregrass and Ozark types. Educa tional expenditures take a high proportion of the total outlay in both the Black Belt County and the Delta County, a result that is not surprising with their youthful populations. On other matters of public finance mixed results occur. The Delta County is less de pendent on intergovernmental revenues than expected while the Black Belt County exhibits more autonomy in school district taxa tion than predicted. And with regard to political partisanship Delta County voters seem less committed to the Democratic Party than those in the Black Belt counties.
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for the factor score arrays for three-factor solutions of reduced data matrices of 61 common attributes for each state. Table 5 , somewhat contrary to the visual comparison largely of political attributes, shows that the Black Belt and Delta Counties are more similar than the two Urban Counties. However, many of the attri butes lost from analysis due to the reduced data bases are political attributes. It comes as no real surprise that these types of counties retain much of the socioeconomic structure that comprises the contemporary (and past) popular image of the Old South.
Conclusion
The hypotheses that provoked this line of inquiry all received at least modest support. The results do suggest basic lines of similar politicocultural cleavages at work in two separated southern states. Still, one might ask, do these cleavages contribute to an under standing of contemporary political conflicts? For the most part the data used here do not speak to that point. To be sure, the differ ences among the areas in Presidential contests as shown in Tables 3  and 4 is clearly evident but those differences may simply reflect in many cases the "friends and neighbors" syndrome so familiar to students of Southern electoral politics.
The answer is that the cleavages uncovered here merely pro vide a base for further explorations. Two such areas of research would be the impact of these politicocultural areas upon electoral results, as mentioned above, and upon legislative behavior. If commonalities and differences among voters, legislators, or any other state political actors are to be examined along regional or politicocultural lines, then those analyses should be in terms of regions or political cultures and not arbitrary cartographical dis tinctions as has so often been done in the past.
But while this type of analysis may help to unravel some old mysteries, it may also reveal new mysteries. An example of this is the electoral support given to George Wallace in presidential and/or gubernatorial campaigns in these areas. Not surprising to most would be the lower levels of voting support that he received in the Urban County of either state and in the Ozark County, nor the strong support he garnered in 1968 in Arkansas' Delta region. But 47 in Alabama his strongest support has been from the NorthernWiregrass area and he has fared least well in the Black Belt region. One explanation well may be that in his home state of Alabama, his populist appeals have touched a responsive chord in more Moralis tic areas, while his early disregard of racist appeals did not endear him to Black Belt voters. Then, as he turned to such appeals, voters in the Black Belt were increasingly black. The opposite results obtained in Arkansas politicocultural areas, at least in part, because citizens there were much less aware of the evolution of Wallace's policy stand. Of course, data of a very different sort would be required to validate this explanation.
In any event, this study is an exploratory one. Similar research in the future should expand in two directions. The first of these is spatial. Other states must be examined in the same way as Alabama and Arkansas, which may not be sufficiently indicative of the South, let alone the nation.
The second direction is temporal. If cultural differences are involved, then these regional developments are rooted in history. Moreover, the Urban County as a distinct political subculture in the American South is a relatively recent development. Quantitative historical analysis of regionalism in the American states might well offer new insights into the movement and evolution of political culture and perhaps even open our eyes to the future. 48 Notes
